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FILLING THE BLA
The Internet is 'a unique and wholly
new medium of worldwide human communica-
tion.'"'1  This pronouncement of the United
States Supreme Court echoes what most of the
American population has known for some time.
The emergence of cyberspace has dramatically
changed the nature of electronic communications, and
consumers are conducting online transactions at a tremendous pace.
While this revolution has obviously increased the amount and types of information available
to American consumers, it has also achieved a different result: businesses now have access to an
unprecedented amount of personal information. In turn, there exists a danger that this informa-
tion will be used by the businesses in a way that abuses the consumer. This Note will address
the current state of the law regarding privacy of consumers' personal information, its inadequa-
cies, and the reasons why the United States should adopt a statutory framework to regulate the
use of personal information collected by businesses.
LEGAL PROTECTION FOR
ONLINE PRIVACY
BY R. CRAIG TOLLIVER
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Imagine that you are "surfing the
Internet, one day when you come
upon a webpage that claims to have
established a large database of infor-
mation on Internet users. Even
though this database operator will
eventually charge a fee for its use, it
is currently offering users a free
search of the database. Imagine fur-
ther that the database claims to have
grouped information by the e-mail
addresses of users, even though it
promises to eventually assign "real"
legal names to each of these e-mail
addresses. After typing in your own
e-mail address and running a search,
you are shocked to learn that the
database has a listing of your "most
visited" Internet sites, along with
other private information such as a
compilation of many of your online
purchases and catalogue orders.
After you contact your attorney, you
are even more shocked to learn that
this type of online snooping and
information gathering is legal.
Indeed, on the Internet it seems that
nearly everything is fair game.
The Internet is a highly decentral-
ized, global network which is unique
among communications media in the
variety and depth of personal infor-
mation generated by its use. When
users browse the World Wide Web,
they leave a series of electronic mark-
ers, or "clickstream," on each site that
they visit. A website can capture cer-
tain information about users as they
enter that site. This information
includes the user's e-mail address,
the type of browser used, the type of
computer used, and the Internet
address of the site from which the
user linked to the current site.
This type of information gathering
is invisible and takes place without
the user's knowledge or consent. Of
course, users may also voluntaril dis-
close certain information-such as
names, addresses, and telephone
numbers-in order to access chat
rooms or register for contests. Even
voluntary disclosure carries risk,
though, as the user has no way of
knowing or controlling what happens
to the information days, months, or
even years after it is disclosed. One
common scenario is that users' per-
sonal information is aggregated and
exchanged among different market-
ing firms, which then target and con-
tact potential customers.
While the privacy concern is cur-
rently quite significant, it will most
likely worsen in the future. First,
the Internet is growing at a breath-
taking pace. The increase in the
number of Internet users and data
transmissions will only intensify the
existing problem. Moreover,
enhanced means of access to the
Internet will likely change to make
information exchange even easier,
faster, and more uncontrollable. For
example, television-ready interfaces
now allow users to obtain high-speed
access to the Internet through their
television by use of a hand-held
remote. If a user possessed a connec-
tion with a bandwidth sufficient to
allow the transmission of high quali-
ty video, she could order movies and
other programs from providers
through this connection. If success-
ful, one would expect this merger of
television and Internet communica-
tions to generate vast new reservoirs
of information, such as the movie
preferences and viewing times of a
particular user. This would also
make many other types of informa-
tion available to a potentially unlim-
ited number of unknown third parties.
Second, an increase in the number
of Internet users is likely to generate
more Internet commerce. This trans-
lates to more online purchases and
commonplace disclosures of sensitive
data. Thus, there will be important
economic reasons to quell consumers'
fears about the privacy of their infor-
mation. Consumer studies have
shown that many consumers are
wary about using the Internet
because of information privacy con-
cerns.2 Under current law, those
concerns are justified.
The third, and perhaps most inva-
sive, concern is what can be termed
the "monitoring problem." While
the user chooses what pages to visit
and what links to explore, it is the
user's computer equipment and not
the user herself who actually does
the communicating. The monitoring
problem exists because all online
communications necessarily take
place "behind the scenes." Therefore,
the user faces the unavoidable prob-
lem of not knowing exactly what
information has been provided by her
Internet browser.
At first, the monitoring problem
seems of little consequence. Most
users would rightly assume that the
producer of a commercial Internet
browser, such as Netscape or
Microsoft, would not communicate
any information unless authorized.
But most fail to realize that software
other than the main browser is
engaged during Internet communica-
tions. These additional pieces of soft-
ware are commonly known as "plug-
ins." Plug-ins can also transfer infor-
mation to and from the user's com-
puter, usually for specific purposes.
Examples of plug-ins are a stock tick-
er which continuously displays the
price of certain investments, a pro-
gram which displays the current
weather, or a sports score updater.
With plug-ins, a single Internet
connection may begin to resemble a
busy eight-lane freeway; it is no
longer clear who, or what, is control-
ling the communication. Nor does
the user know exactly what informa-
tion is being sent from her computer.
The Internet browser or plug-in per-
forms this function based on the
user's commands and the data that
has been encoded in the software by
the publisher. Therefore, unlike in a
spoken conversation, the user in an
Internet communication does not
exercise direct control over the sig-
nals being sent on her behalf. If
designed properly, the browser or
plug-in could access other data
stored on the user's computer, infor-
mation never intended to be dis-
closed to anyone.
Imagine a scenario
in which a computer
microprocessor manu-
facturer chooses to dig-





puter sold with that
company's processor
will have its own digi-
tal "fingerprint." If
this code number was
transmitted by Internet software,
the user's "fingerprint" would stick to
every site the user visited. Privacy
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lings and invasion of priva-
cy are occurring at a rate
faster than legislators can
effectively devise solutions
at both the national and
state levels. Admit-tedly,
specific and detailed legis-
lation is necessary to deal
with these crimes, but the
law frequently has resort-
ed to broad non-specific
legislation to prevent com-
mission with impunity
until a solution is found. 4
These words of the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania strike at the heart of
the problem. It is widely recognized
that the current state of online pro-
tections-whether statutory, com-
mon law, or self-regulation imposed
by the private sector-is insufficient
to safeguard consumer privacy.
However, there does not seem to be a
This type of online
snooping and
information gathering





consensus of opinion as to the most
efficient way to achieve this end result.
On October 19, 1998, Congress
passed the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act, the first law aimed at
protecting online privacy. 5 This
enforcement of the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act was prelimi-
narily enjoined on February 1, 1999.6
This law required websites to obtain
"verifiable parental consent for the
collection, use, or disclosure of per-
sonal information from children."
'7
There is no comparable protection
for adult consumers' personal infor-
mation collected by businesses
through an online medium. Instead,
Congress has left it to the private
sector to regulate itself. When a con-
sumer does resort to the courts to
safeguard personal privacy, however,
she is generally left without an ade-
quate cause of action. For instance,
in Jessup-Morgan v. America Online,
Inc., 8 the plaintiff brought suit
against her Internet service provider
America Online (AOL), because AOL
provided her name and other person-
al information to another subscriber.
AOL gave out this information in
response to a subpoena served in con-
nection with a civil lawsuit between
the plaintiff and another party,
about whom the plaintiff anony-
mously posted allegedly defamatory
material. 9  In addition to several
state law claims, including breach of
contract and invasion
of privacy, the plaintiff





tempted to invoke the
ECPA, which prohibits
disclosure of the con-
tents of an electronic
communication to any
person or entity absent
the occurrence of cer-
tain conditions.1 1  However, the
court found the ECPA to be inappli-
cable to these facts. The statute
expressly defines "contents," as
applied to electronic communica-
tions, to include "any information
concerning the substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication."
12
The court noted that information
concerning the name or identity of a
communication's author is not pro-
hibited by the ECPA. 13 In fact, dis-
closure is expressly authorized by 18
U.S.C. §2703(c)(1)(A) (1998), which states:
Except as provided in sub-
paragraph (B), a provider
of electronic communica-
tion service or remote com-
puting service may dis-
close a record or other
information pertaining to
a subscriber or customer of
such service (not including
the contents of communi-
cations covered by subsec-
tion (a) or (b) of this sec-
tion) to any person other than
a governmental entity.
On this basis, the court dismissed
the plaintiffs ECPA claim.
14
Breach of contract, breach of war-
ranty, and claims of fraud can pro-
vide some relief to consumers. The
success of these claims, however,
turns on whether the Internet
provider has represented that per-
sonal information collected from the
subscriber will not be used for cer-
tain purposes, and yet takes actions
inconsistent with that representa-
tion. Likewise, contract or fraud
claims will provide little or no protec-
tion without any express or implied
representations of confidentiality.
Even without specific privacy leg-
islation, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has shown a will-
ingness to police the collection and
use of consumer information over the
Internet through §5 of the FTC Act,
which gives the FTC authority over
"unfair" and "deceptive" trade prac-
tices. 15 In the absence of a privacy
statute prohibiting certain uses of a
consumer's personal information, the
FTC's authority will likely be
invoked only when a provider mis-
represents one of its privacy policies
to a consumer.
On August 13, 1998, the FTC
released a complaint and agreement
containing a consent order that illus-
trates how the FTC attempts to reg-
ulate this field under its authority.
The agency alleged certain deceptive
trade practices by Geocities, a
provider and website operator.
According to the complaint, Geocities
represented to consumers that the
information they provided would not
be shared with third parties, unless
consumers specifically indicated an
interest in that third party's prod-
ucts or services. 16  Nevertheless,
Geocites allegedly provided this
information to third parties. The
consent order stated that (1)
Geocities would no longer engage in
deceptive practices involving the col-
lection or dissemination of private
consumer information, (2) Geocities
must thereafter obtain consent from
parents of minors before releasing
this information to any third party,
and (3) Geocities must make certain
disclosures to its users regarding its
collection of personal information.
Specifically, Geocities must now
disclose these matters: what infor-
mation is being collected; the intend-
ed use(s) of the information; the
types of third parties to whom it will
be disclosed, whether advertisers,
mailing list companies, the public, or
others; the means by which con-
sumers can access their own infor-
mation as collected; the consumer's
ability to directly remove or have
that information removed from
respondent's databases; and the pro-
cedures to delete personal identify-
ing information from Geocities' data-
bases and any limitations related to
such deletion.
Outside this narrow provider mis-
representation context, the FTC is
without regulatory authority. This
void has not been filled; legislatures
and courts have both been silent.
1 7
This lack of cases can be attributed
to two chief factors: (1) this problem
is not serious or widespread enough
to prompt consumers to vindicate
their rights or (2) the problem may
be serious and widespread, but con-
sumers cannot file lawsuits because
they have no adequate cause of
action. Developments in other coun-
tries demonstrate that this second
reason is at the root of the problem.
While American lawmakers have neg-
lected the need for online privacy, their
European counterparts have responded.
STATUTORY INTERVENTION
OR PRIVATE REGULATION?
The gap in opinion between the
proponents of statutory enactments
and those of private industry regula-
tion has recently grown more pro-
nounced as a result of the European
Union (E.U.) Council of Ministers'
Directive on Personal Data, which
binds all E.U. member nations.
1 8
This Directive requires that con-
sumers must give their consent
before any information about them
may be processed by another.
Further, consumers must be told
that information is being collected,
and how it will be used.1 9 Certain
classes of sensitive information, such
as a person's race, ethnicity, health,
sex life, and religious or political
beliefs, may not be processed. 20 In
addition, each member country must
appoint an independent government
authority to oversee the activities of
companies that process personal
information. 2 1
The most far-reaching measure of
the Directive requires that, as of
October 25, 1998, each country pro-
hibit the transfer of information to
countries without an "adequate level
of protection." To determine whether
a country's level of protection is "ade-
quate," the Directive considers both
the substantive rules and enforce-
ment mechanisms of challenged
countries. The obvious implications
of this transfer prohibition have
fueled speculations of a "cyber trade
war."2 2  As of February 1999, the
E.U. and the United States had post-
poned the pending "war," but they
had not arrived at a satisfactory
solution to the countries' differ-
ences. 2 3 This difference can be rec-
onciled only if (1) the American pri-
vate sector voluntarily sets up an
adequate framework of protection
guidelines and enforcement mecha-
nisms, or (2) Congress enacts legisla-
tion to govern this uncertain area.
At this time, President Clinton
clearly favors a market-led initiative
to protect consumers' private infor-
mation. On May 18, 1998, President
Clinton stated that he and the
Japanese Prime Minister had agreed
to move forward with a "market-ori-
ented, private-sector-led approach to
enhance privacy, protect intellectual
property, and encourage the free flow
of information and commerce on the
Internet. ' 24 And on December 1,
1998, President Clinton again
announced his intention that the
Internet be self-regulated. 2 5  The
Clinton administration has cau-
tioned, however, that if the private
industry cannot develop "effective
privacy protection," the administra-
tion would reconsider its preference
for self-regulation. 2 6 Ira Magaziner,
senior advisor to President Clinton
on Internet issues, believes that the
United States will soon meet the
requirements of the E.U. Directive
through self-regulation.
2 7
The Internet industry would likely
embrace such a scheme of self-regu-
lation. An adequate system of pro-
tection for personal information
would only increase the number of
online users and buyers. In a recent
study, non-Internet users cited their
concern over privacy as the main rea-
son they were staying off the
Internet. 2 8 Among Internet users,
81 percent were concerned about
threats to their personal privacy.
2 9
This growing concern has been
reflected in the recent actions of sev-
eral U.S. companies. The American
company, NCR, an international
leader in the area of data warehouse
software, has announced a set of ini-
tiatives that will enable its clients to
meet or exceed the European Union's
privacy requirements. 3 0 According
to NCR, new features of its data
warehouse software will permit con-
sumers to opt out of personal data
collection, obtain reports on the type
and use of data being collected, and
correct information already gathered.
31
In addition, the leading website
operators have begun an online cam-
paign to promote personal privacy on
the Internet. 3 2 These website opera-
tors-America Online, Excite,
Infoseek, Lycos, Netscape, Snap, and
Yahoo! together claim to reach nine
out of ten Internet users. Their cam-
paign hopes to encourage companies
to adopt such privacy policies as
revealing their use of personal data
and obtaining the prior consent of
individual users.
3 3
Despite this initiative by the pri-
vate sector, international negotia-
tions have so far failed to convince
European officials that American
safeguards can adequately secure
consumer privacy. 34 The E.U. wants
further assurances that computer
users will have the right of access to
their personal data and the right to
redress if they suffer damage because
the information is misused.35 The E.U.
insists that an independent arbitrator
decide on such damage claims.36 Steve
Lucas, a member of the U.S. delega-
tion to the E.U. Directive, has noted
his "serious doubts" that the E.U.
would accept the self-regulation
schemes currently proposed by U.S.
a0110 R, U-1 'F-
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business groups.
3 7
Opponents of statute-based priva-
cy protections argue that the con-
cerns of consumers can be handled
most effectively by private industry.
These opponents rely principally on
the "laissez-faire" belief that the
government should not interfere in
areas of the economy that can be
regulated through private initia-
tive. Despite this argument, several




The first reason for a statutory
solution concerns the manner in
which the user's privacy is invaded.
Often, personal information about
consumers is taken without their
knowledge. A consumer may never
know that a certain website has
taken information and distributed it
to third parties. Only when con-
sumers know that they have been
harmed can they effectively address
their concerns with "watchdog"
groups or pursue legal remedies. But
when the harm is dealt without wit-
ness or awareness, the single con-
sumer or small group can hardly pur-
sue these companies secretly violat-
ing industry standards.
If the appropriate guidelines were
statutory, however, and enforceable
by an agency such as the FTC,
providers would be much more reluc-
tant to exploit the unaware. The FTC










son for a statu-
tory scheme, related to the first, is
the inefficiency of the enforcement
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so decentralized, its agility allows
and even encourages users to rapidly
jump between "links" on webpages to
display pages that are stored on dif-
ferent computers owned by different
businesses. In addition, an Internet
user usually has several different
connections open at the same time.
For example, a user may be viewing
one page while he or she is simulta-
neously exchanging information with
another entity, such as an advertise-
ment found on the webpage current-
ly displayed. As technology and con-
nection speeds advance even further,
it is likely that the number and
nature of simultaneous connections
will increase dramatically. Industry
protections could hardly keep up.
Any private enforcement mecha-
nism would have to be contractually
based to create some representation
of privacy on behalf of the website.
However, it would be impractical and
inefficient for an Internet user to dig-
itally "sign" an information use
agreement with every entity with
whom information is exchanged.
Even if this were possible, a chal-
lenging provider could litigate a myr-
iad of issues relating to the validity
of the contract with the user. The
expense of such litigation would like-
ly discourage consumers from bring-
ing contract-based claims against
Consumers must have
fidence in their onl
ivacy for the Intern,




tity, will not inspi
such confidence.
providers. Therefore, Internet users
would be resigned to browse without
protest as they are exploited by
online entities.
By analogy, these concerns resem-
ble similar consumer-based concerns
that were remedied by passage of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
3 8
The purpose of that Act was to elimi-
nate abusive debt collection prac-
tices. 3 9 The Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act gave consumers a read-
ily available means to vindicate their
rights against businesses which took
advantage of them, very similar to
the purposes that would be served by
an online privacy protection law.
Just as consumers should be protect-
ed from unfair leverage in a debt col-
lection situation, they should also be
protected in cyberspace, where pow-
erful companies build the machines,
program the software, and control
the networks.
A third factor that compels a
statutory scheme is consumer confi-
dence in online privacy. In order for
the Internet to reach its full potential
as a medium of interstate commerce,
consumers have to be reassured
about the level of privacy that they
will enjoy. It is unlikely that a pri-
vately initiated protection system,
with a toothless enforcement entity,
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the information that should be provid-
ed to online operators. Adults are in a
very similar situation as they have no
way of knowing when information is
being collected. As a result,
Congress should also extend con-




The only law that Congress has
enacted in this area is the Children's
Online Privacy Protection Act of
1998. Section 1303(a)(1) states:
It is unlawful for an opera-
tor of a website or online
service directed to chil-
dren, or any operator that
has actual knowledge that
it is collecting personal
information from a child,
to collect personal infor-
mation from a child in a
manner that violates the
regulations prescribed
under subsection (b). 40
Section 1303(b) then provides
that, within a year from enactment,
the Federal Trade Commission must
provide regulations which establish
certain safeguards. Those regula-
tions must require the website oper-
ators to post notices that they collect
information from children; obtain
verifiable parental consent for the
collection, use, or disclosure of per-
sonal information; and maintain rea-
sonable internal policies and guide-
lines with respect to information
gathering. Section 1303(c) treats a
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that state as a C
result of any vio-
lation of an FTC
regulation promulgated under
§1303.42 The remedies available
under the Act include both injunctive
relief and damage awards.
43
Other than this Act, several bills
have been introduced into Congress
that recognized the need for statuto-
ry protections of consumers' private
information. Though these proposals
never became law, they nevertheless
suggest increasing legislative sup-
port for a comprehensive statute.
The proposed Data Privacy Act
called for the online computer indus-
try to enact certain guidelines to pro-
tect consumers.4 4 Under its provi-
sions, the providers would notify the
user that information is being col-
lected, the nature of that informa-
tion, and that the user has the option
to prohibit disclosure of the informa-
tion. 45 This notice would be provided
before or at the same time the data is
collected. At the request of the user,
the providers must further provide a
description of third party recipients
of the information, allowing the user




Privacy and Consumer Empower-
ment Act called for FTC rules that
mandated that consumers be
informed that information is being
collected about them, that users
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)f their communicatior
collected information could be used
or sold to a third party, and that
providers "exercise control over the
collection of personal information
and to stop the unauthorized use,
reuse, disclosure or sale of that infor-
mation."4 7  The proposed act also
contained findings of fact. One such
finding stated that further protec-
tions are needed to ensure that con-
sumers' rights are "retained and
respected" by other entities doing
business in cyberspace. 48 The pro-
posed Act also estimated that some
five million young Americans used
the Internet and that this number
was expected to triple by the year 2000.4 9
Before enacting online consumer
protection legislation, Congress must
first decide what exactly is to be pro-
tected. On one hand, it is vital to the
functioning of the Internet that busi-
nesses be able to collect information
from consumers. On the other hand,
the individual consumer lacks the
awareness and resources to chal-
lenge exploitative collection. The dif-
ficult task is to design legislation
which puts consumers on a level
playing field with the online busi-
nesses. Ideally, online businesses
should be prohibited from taking
"personal" information from con-
sumers without their knowledge.
But this is not as simple as it
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certain data as part of every commu-
nication. For example, every connec-
tion requires a commercial operator
to identify the computer network
from which a user has connected so
that responses can be sent to the cor-
rect part of the Internet. This type of
identifying information must be col-
lected.
In contrast, an operator would
have little, if any, justification for
extracting information which is
stored on the user's computer. One
response may be to draft language
allowing operators to collect, without
the user's consent, only information
"necessary and vital to the operation
of Internet communications and
the common protocols which are
embodied therein." This language
is still broad but could be effectively
narrowed by rules and regulations
promulgated by an agency having
jurisdiction over the execution of
the law, such as the FTC, or by
judicial interpretation.
A second hurdle to uniform legis-
lation is the presence of "limited-pur-
pose information." This data the con-
sumer has willingly supplied to a
commercial operator for a limited
transaction, such as credit card infor-
mation, names, addresses, telephone
numbers, e-mail addresses, and the
like. This supply of information,
however, should not enable commer-
cial operators to further appropriate
the information for purposes beyond
the scope of the original transmis-
sion. The statute should establish
guidelines requiring commercial
operators to obtain consent from the
users for any non-implied uses of the
information, or, alternatively, grant
the FTC jurisdiction to promulgate
its own guidelines. Because of the
ephemeral nature of the medium,
there will most likely be evidentiary
disputes over whether the user, for
example, clicked the "Yes" button to
allow the operator to use her infor-
mation in a certain manner. For this
reason, the guidelines should require
the operators to obtain consent
through a somewhat more stable
forum, such as an e-mail from the user.
Another wildcard concerns the
federal agency which should be given
enforcement authority over the
terms of an Internet privacy law. It
is unlikely that existing knowledge of
the relationship between consumers
and commercial entities will be suffi-
cient to allow any agency to under-
stand the dynamics of the cyberspace
environment. Unlike television and
radio, the Internet is a two-way com-
munication that may not be occur-
ring on a large scale environment.
And, unlike face-to-face conversa-
tions, the Internet involves commu-
nications between invisible parties
who, as already discussed, are not
actually exercising control over all
aspects of their communication.
Therefore, it may be appropriate to
develop another administrative divi-
sion, such as a Department of the
Internet (DOI), which may exercise
its authority from within a parent
organization, such as the FTC or
FCC. Much akin to the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department,
the DOI would contain a staff of
experts who would enforce Internet
regulations and promulgate rules on
behalf of the FTC or FCC. The DOI
division would be able to respond to
rapidly developing, complex Internet
issues, something the FTC or FCC,
as a whole, may not be able to do.
The world of cyberspace is, in
some respects, similar to the busi-
ness world that we all inhabit and
create with every transaction. It
revolves around the transfer of infor-
mation between parties. In many
other respects, however, cyberspace
is dramatically different. Once
online, one cannot monitor the
behavior of the parties with whom
one deals; indeed, one cannot even
monitor the behavior of one's own
agent, the computer. This lack of
awareness and control leaves the
consumer vulnerable, without the
incentive or even ability to guard
against exploitation by others.
The explosion in popularity and
utility of the Internet has created the
unique world of cyberspace. Not sur-
prisingly, the creation of this new
forum has also brought equally
unique and unforeseen problems.
Consumers are adrift in this strange
new universe and cannot be expected
to defend themselves, using technol-
ogy they may not understand,
against predators they cannot fully
perceive. Congress should act now,
before the nation becomes even more
dependent on online communica-
tions. The government must protect
consumers from the biggest black
hole in cyberspace-the consumption
and misuse of personal information. *
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